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This  paper  deals  with  the  impact  of  social  contributions  and  tax  cuts  (which  are 
considered  as  operating  subsidies)  on  new  firms’  probability  of  survival  and  economic 
performance. We use a rich matched database of French firms that were newly created in 
1998  and  that  include  entrepreneurs’  individual  characteristics  and  firm  economic  and 
financial  variables.  We  implement  propensity  score  matching  models  and  show  that  (i) 
subsidized firms are more likely to survive after the first two years; (ii) bank loans increase 
the probability of survival, be they subsidized or not; and (iii) operating subsidies allow firms 
to  increase  their  turnover.  However,  no  significant  effects  of  these  subsidies  on  other 
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Over the last decade, economists have devoted more and more attention to firm entry 
and exit. In developed countries, high turnover (entry and exit) rates are observed every year 
(Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi, 2003). The theoretical approach to this phenomenon 
focuses on the process of creative destruction from an evolutionary perspective (Baldwin, 
1995; Geroski, 1995; Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995, 1998). It recognizes that 
firms are heterogeneous and that the shift in sectoral composition that takes place via firm 
turnover is essential for technological progress. However, the ability of firms to survive also 
depends on institutional and regulatory settings. In Europe and North America, public and 
private institutions have developed a large range of services and forms of support to help 
start-ups and small firms to survive and develop (Gu et al., 2006).  
In this paper, we assess the impact of public operating subsidies on newly created 
firms’ survival and economic performance. We use a rich matched database of a cohort of 
French firms that were newly created in 1998. We follow these firms year by year over the 
1998-2006  period.  This  database  enables  us  to  control  not  only  for  new  firms’  annual 
characteristics (financial variables) but also for entrepreneurs’ background (e.g., education, 
previous experience before starting the new business). Because approximately one third of our 
sample consists of subsidized firms and public support is not randomly distributed, we use a 
propensity score matching method to control for selection bias and estimate the impact of 
operating subsidies on newly created firms’ probabilities to survive and to develop. 
Our results show that subsidized start-up firms are more likely to survive after the first 
two years of existence. We also find that operating subsidies have a positive impact on the 
turnover growth rate. However, we find no significant effect on other performance criteria 
(apparent  labor  productivity,  apparent  capital  productivity,  profitability  and  value-added 
growth) in either absolute or growth rate terms.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the impact of 
public support on firm survival and economic performance. Section 3 analyzes the regulations 
concerning public financial support of start-ups in France. Section 4 describes the data we use 
in our empirical analyses. Section 5 explains the econometric strategy. Section 6 presents our 
results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Firm demography and public support of new firms. 
 
In all developed countries, firm demography is characterized by high entry and exit 
rates. Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2003) show that a large proportion of firms enter a 
given market as a similar percentage exit the same market. Because these two phenomena 
tend to offset each other, the static view of the enterprise demography is very different from 
the  dynamic  view.  Among  a  cohort  of  newly  created  firms,  80%  survive  the  first  year 
following entry, 50% survive five years after entry, and approximately 30% remain seven 
years after entry. This turnover is part of the creative destruction process: for a given market, 
a substantial proportion of firm entrants replace a similar proportion of exiters. In the context 
of firms’ ability to adapt to their economic environment, some are able to grow and survive, 
while the others are obliged to exit the market (Jovanovic, 1982). This process of creative 
destruction is analyzed through the heterogeneity among firms’ behavior, which results in 
permanent  changes in the composition of the population of firms (Baldwin, 1995). Some 
firms entering a given market unseat older ones because the latter are unable to adapt to new 
technologies  and  production  processes.  Learning  models  (Jovanovic,  1982;  Ericson  and 
Pakes,  1995)  suggest  that  firms  may  enter  an  industry  at  sub-optimal  scale  to  obtain  the  
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opportunity to learn and will subsequently expand if successful. In the early years following 
entry, firms have to find the most efficient organizational structure and determine the optimal 
scale at which they can be competitive. Thus, two potential factors may have an impact on a 
firm’s probability of survival: a “learning by doing effect”, which is the ability of a firm to 
adapt  to  its  environment,  and  an  “expectation  effect”,  which  is  the  ability  of  the  firm  to 
forecast the evolution of its market.  
The flows of small firms entering and exiting the market each year are very important 
as these small firms represent the large majority of firms. In 2006, 99.9% of the nearly 26 
million firms in the U.S. were businesses with fewer than 500 employees, and 97.5% were 
businesses  with  20  employees  or  fewer  (Gu  et  al.,  2008).  The  figures  are  substantively 
identical for France. The importance of the creation of new firms explains why, in all OECD 
countries, public authorities have developed programs to finance and assist new small firms. 
All of these programs aim at supporting new or existing small firms. Gu et al. (2008) single 
out sixteen main programs in the U.S.: nine are devoted to assistance (entrepreneurship and 
management education, consulting, services), two to loan supply and credit guarantee, two to 
grants, and three are jointly devoted to business assistance and loan supply. Most of these 
programs  target  people  who  are  considered  as  disadvantaged  in  economic  competition 
because of their ethnic origin, their gender or their geographical location. Despite their policy 
importance,  such  programs  have  not  been  evaluated  using  the  most  rigorous  methods  to 
ensure that  causal program effects are correctly measured. The main obstacles to reliable 
evaluations of these programs are the small sample sizes of firms that are studied, the firms’ 
low response rates to surveys, and weak evaluation methodologies. 
The  following  studies  use  econometric  methods  that  are  designed  to  eliminate 
selection bias and evaluate whether the difference in the outcomes can be attributed to public 
support. Pfeiffer and Reize (2000) study the effect of public subsidies on survival of firms 
created by unemployed people in eastern and western Germany. Unexpectedly, estimations 
show  that  the  firms  created  by  unemployed  people  that  receive  public  support  in  eastern 
Germany have a lower probability of survival than do those firms that receive no support. The 
same pattern is not observed for western Germany. The authors explain this paradoxical result 
for eastern Germany by a “cash and carry effect”: some people receiving public subsidies 
when creating their businesses only want to get the financial support and close their business 
soon  after.  However,  Pfeiffer  and  Reize  (2000)  analyze  business  survival  one  year  after 
creation. Almus (2001) studies the same sample of firms but extends the period to five years. 
He finds that, in eastern Germany, firms’ survival and employment growth are positively 
related to the receipt of public subsidies. According to his conclusions, five years after firm 
creation, the effect of public support overcomes the cash and carry effect. 
 Oh et al. (2009) evaluate the effect of the credit guarantee policy in South Korea, 
which was intended to support small and medium firms following the 1999 financial crisis. 
Their  results  show  that  credit  guarantees  positively  influence  firms’  survival  rate  and 
employment but not their investment and productivity growth. Using French data, Crépon and 
Duguet (2003) study the impacts of capital subsidies from public administration and loans 
from banks on firms created in 1994 during the subsequent three years.  The main public 
subsidy is a lump sum
1 that is granted to unemployed people who start a new business. They 
estimate  a  multinomial  logit  model  of  the  financial  structure  of  each  new  business 
distinguishing between public subsidies, bank loans and a combination of both. Then they use 
a matching process to compare firms’ survival according to their financial resources. They 
find a positive effect of this subsidy on survival of new firms created by both short-term and 
                                                 
 
1 It amounts to 32,000 francs or approximately 5,000 Euros.  
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long-term unemployed people. In addition, bank loans alone have no positive effect, but they 
reinforce the effect of public subsidies on firm survival.  
 
3. What public financial support is given to new firms in France? 
 
In this paper, we use a large sample of new firms that is representative of all firms that 
were  created  in  France  in  1998,  including  firms  consisting  of  one  self-employed  person. 
When starting their businesses, 34.5% of new entrepreneurs received public financial support; 
22.2% were subsidized by the ACCRE program (Aide aux Chômeurs Créant ou Reprenant 
une Entreprise). This is a special public support program for unemployed people who create 
or take over a firm. The remaining 12.3% of new entrepreneurs received subsidies or tax 
reductions (exemptions) from local or regional authorities.  
Two categories of new entrepreneurs are eligible for the ACCRE: unemployed people 
who receive public unemployment benefits before starting their businesses and people who 
receive social income from the public administration. In 1998, the ACCRE was devoted to 
persons who created a firm, whatever the legal status of their firm and the entrepreneur’s 
personal  status  (according  to  French  legislation,  he  or  she  can  be  a  wage  earner,  a 
professional, or an employer). Any applicant to the ACCRE must complete a form that is sent 
to  the  district  labor  administration.  The  labor  administration  controls  the  conditions  of 
eligibility  of  the  applicant  and  evaluates  the  survival  and  profitability  prospects  of  the 
proposed project. For those who are entitled to the ACCRE, there are two advantages. First, 
from the creation of their business, they are fully exempted from paying social contributions 
for one year
2. In addition, those who are entitled to social income continue to receive it during 
a period of six months following the creation of their business. During the next six months, 
their business income is taken into account to revise the amount of the social income. This 
second form of support is important because during the first six months, and to a lesser degree 
during the first year, the entrepreneur receives an income each month that is similar to a 
subsidy and is the equivalent of 50% of the minimum wage (for a single person). This income 
can increase to 100% of the minimum wage if the entrepreneur is married with two or more 
children.  
The ACCRE is a form of public support that is granted at the very beginning of the 
business for a one-year period. It takes the form of a social contribution for the people who 
received unemployment benefits before starting their business and the payment of a social 
income for those who were already entitled to this income. Furthermore, if the business does 
not succeed, eligible people retain their rights to unemployment benefits and social income 
(i.e., during the operation of the business, the payment of these benefits is interrupted but not 
suppressed). Therefore, the ACCRE is a real incentive for the unemployed to create their own 
firms. It is one of the instruments of public policy that aims at reducing unemployment in the 
French  economy.  First,  it  aims  at  suppressing  any  barriers  to  firm  creation  because  new 
entrepreneurs do not lose their rights to social benefits even if their new business fails. In 
addition, they can take advantage of a one-year exemption from social contributions when 
starting  their  business  and,  under  certain  conditions,  can  still  receive  support  from  social 
income programs.  
The ACCRE is a form of support that we call “operating subsidies” to distinguish it 
from  capital  subsidy  programs,  where  a  lump  sum  is  granted  when  the  business  starts. 
However, these contribution cuts must be carefully distinguished from the programs of social 
                                                 
 
2 In France, social contributions, which must be paid on wages as well as on the incomes of professionals 
and independent workers, amount to approximately 50% of the compensation (payment).   
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contribution reduction for low wage earners that have been implemented in France since the 
middle of the 1990s. In these programs, the social contribution cuts are focused on low-paid 
jobs and are in force for a long period of time. They aim at creating low-paid jobs through the 
substitution  between  unskilled  and  skilled  workers  and  reducing  the  prices  of  goods  and 
services produced by industries that employ a high proportion of low-paid workers.  
New entrepreneurs who were already employed before starting their businesses are not 
entitled to the ACCRE, but they are able to benefit from different tax cuts and exemptions that 
are  usually  decided  at  the  local  or  regional  level
3.  They  represented  12.3%  of  all  new 
entrepreneurs  in  1998.  While  the  conditions  of  eligibility  for  these  supports  are  clearly 
different from the ACCRE, from an economic point of view they also concern tax cuts, which 
can be compared to public operating subsidies.  
 
 
Table 1 - Subsidies to New Firms in France 
 
Number of firms created in 1998 Percentage
ACCRE 2351 22.2
Other social contribution 
exemptions and tax cuts
1305 12.3
No public subsidy 6799 64.4
No answer 104 0.1
Total 10559 100  
Source: 1998-2006 FICUS and 1998 SINE Survey. ACCRE: social contribution exemptions and social income 
granted to unemployed people who start a business (see explanation above in section 2).  
 
 
4. The Data 
 
In this paper, we use an original and rich statistical dataset created by matching two 
data sources from INSEE (the French Institute of Statistics): an entrepreneur survey (SINE) 
and a database (FICUS). 
 
4.1 The data sources 
 
The  objective  of  the  SINE  ("système  d’information  sur  les  nouvelles  enterprises") 
survey  is  to  follow  a  generation  of  newly  created  firms  over  a  period  of  five  years.  We 
concentrate on the 1998 cohort (all the firms were created during the first semester). Our 
sample consists of 30,000 firms and is representative of all firms created during this period. 
Sample firms were surveyed three times: early in the entry process, three years after firm 
creation and five years after firm creation. The firms surveyed operate in the manufacturing, 
construction, trade and services sectors (except financial activities). SINE includes micro-
firms, in particular those in the services sector, which represent the majority of start-ups: 
nearly 60% of new firms are created in the trade and other services sectors (see Table 2). 
More than 85% of firms in the sample have one or two jobs, including firms made up of only 
                                                 
 




4. We only retained "ex-nihilo creations" - that is, firms that use new 
means of production – in our sample (i.e., a new store or a new firm that did not exist before 
1998 and that produces goods or services). 
Firm datasets (FICUS) give information for all firms that are subject to the two major 
tax regimes. These regimes cover virtually the entire productive system, representing roughly 
95 percent of taxable firms in terms of sales. The data were kept for the period of 1998-2006. 
For each year, we have a sample of approximately 2.5 million firms. The datasets mostly 
contain various economic situation indicators, e.g., value-added, capital investment, profits, 
and turnover. 
                                                 
 
4 In France in 1998, there was no legal differentiation between firms with and without wage earners (in the 
latter case, there is only one self-employed person).   
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Table 2: Statistics on Subsidized and Non-Subsidized Firms (in %) 
 




Initial Amount Of Capital (Euros) 
Less than 2,000
10.55 19.45
2,000 to 4,000 14.45 11.86









Previous Activity on The Labor Market
Employee 25.03 60.92
Unemployed Less Than one Year  39.75 13.04




Food Industry 2.38 1.79
Non Food Industry 11.09 7.25
Construction  25.64 17.14
Trade 25.53 23.76
Transportation  4.51 5.93
Real Estate Activity  1.93 5.88
Firms Services 14.47 19.78
Individuals Services  11.25 9.58
Education and Health   3.08 8.87  
Source: 1998-2006 FICUS and 1998 SINE Survey 
4.2 The matched database 
 
After  matching,  the  database  contains  10,570  newly  created  firms.  It  contains  an 
important  amount  of  information,  including  both  entrepreneur  and  firm  characteristics 
(economic and financial variables), and gives the opportunity to follow firms from birth to 
potential death between 1998 and 2006. Some firms created in 1998 only appear in FICUS in 
1999 due to delays in administrative record keeping. In contrast, some firms are still recorded 
even  after  they  have  failed.  We  delete  all  such  firms.  We  concentrate  on  entry  without 
considering takeovers or juridical transformations. Due to recording problems, some firms 
disappear for one year within the period but exist in both the year before and the year after. 
These firms are also dropped.  
Table 3 presents the number of firms in the database over the 1998-2006 period. It 
shows that 56.6% of firms survived five years and 46.1% eight years after their creation. 
These results are consistent with the literature (Bartelsman et al., 2003). Considering only 
subsidized  firms,  61.6%  survived  five  years  and  50.7%  survived  eight  years  after  their 
creation. Based on Table 2, it appears that operating subsidies help firms to survive. However,  
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as  entrepreneurs  who  receive  operating  subsidies  are  chosen  based  on  observable  or 
unobservable  characteristics,  these  characteristics  could  explain  the  difference  in  survival 
rates. 
 
Table 3: Number of Firms in the Sample per Year 
Year Number of Firms Subsidized Firms Mean number of 
Employees
1998 10570 3659 1
1999 9210 3310 1.5
2000 8174 2952 2
2001 6839 2527 2.4
2002 6493 2411 2.5
2003 5979 2255 2.6
2004 5661 2132 2.7
2005 4945 1881 2.8
2006 4870 1854 2.9  
Source: 1998-2006 FICUS and 1998 SINE Survey 
 
 
5. Econometric Strategy 
 
In  this  paper,  we  evaluate  the  effect  of  operating  subsidies  on  firm  survival  and 
economic  performance.  Entrepreneurs  who  receive  start-up  subsidies  are  not  randomly 
distributed:  the  public  administration  decides  to  grant  subsidies  based  on  entrepreneurs’ 
profiles and project prospects. Thus, subsidized start-ups face a selection process that depends 
on entrepreneurs’ characteristics (education, professional skills, previous status on the labor 
market, initial amount of capital). To control for this selection bias, we estimate propensity 
score matching (PSM) models (Rubin, 1974; Heckman et al., 1999). The aim of these models 
is  to  build  a  control  group  from  the  population  of  entrepreneurs  who  do  not  get  start-up 
subsidies  and  to  ensure  that  this  control  group  is  as  similar  as  possible  (with  respect  to 
observable characteristics) to the group of entrepreneurs who get start-up subsidies.   
With  our  database,  we  identify  the  subsidized  firms  in  1998  (the  treated  group, 
indicated  by  a  dummy  variable  PB1998  =  1).  The  impact  of  operating  subsidies  on  firm 
survival is measured with the outcome variable yi. Each firm presents two possible results: y0 
(if PB1998 = 0) and y1 (if PB1998 = 1). The effect of subsidies on firm survival (C = y1−y0) is 
unobservable and individual (its distribution is consequently unidentifiable) because y1 and y0 
are  never  simultaneously  observed.  Only  the  realized  result  is  observed:  Y  = 
y1PB1998+y0(1−PB1998).  Y  denotes  the  firm  survival  rate  or  firm  performance  criteria 
(turnover, profitability, apparent labor productivity, apparent capital productivity, value-added 
growth and employment growth). Let Yi be the vector of resulting variables: Yi = (Di). D 
denotes whether or not the firm exits. The unique couple (Y, PB1998) is observed for each 
firm,  and  when  latent  variables  of  result  are  independent  from  treatment,  i.e  when  the 
treatment is random, the average effect on the treated firms Ctreated = E(y1 − y0|PB1998=1) can 
be identified. The identification condition is based on observable characteristics X (control 
variables). From the available literature on firm survival, we choose two types of control 
variables.  First,  we  use  "common"  firm  characteristics  (size,  sector  of  activity,  region). 
Second, we control for entrepreneur characteristics (gender, age, education, etc.). If too many  
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control variables are used, finding a counterfactual can be difficult. In addition, independence 
conditional to the set of variables X is equivalent to independence in relation to propensity 
score  P(X)  corresponding  to  a  one-dimensional  summary  of  matching  variables  and 
estimating  the  probability  of  being  exposed  to  treatment  conditionally  to  these  variables 
(Rubin and Rosenbaum, 1983): (y0, y1) ┴ PB1998|P(X)). Moreover, we impose a maximal 
distance between propensity scores of the treated firms and their neighbors and a common 
support  condition  (see  Figure  1  in  the  Appendix).  First,  we  implement  a  logit  model  to 
estimate propensity scores. In a second step, several matching methods can be used: kernel 
matching,  nearest-neighbor,  radius  matching  or  interval  matching  (see  Caliendo  and 
Kopeinig, 2008, for a detailed presentation of these methods). In our dataset, approximately 
one third of firms are subsidized, so we use the nearest-neighbor method with replacement 




The likelihood of receiving operating subsidies is explained with a logit model. Table 
A1  in  the  Appendix  reports  estimates.  The  model  contains  variables  representing 
entrepreneurs’ characteristics (gender, age, nationality, education, professional skills, labor 
market status before creating the firm: employee, unemployed or inactive), initial amount of 
capital and financial resources (bank loans, personal resources, other types of loans and paid-
up  capital  from  other  companies  or  specific  organizations)  and  a  few  firm  characteristics 
(sector, location and franchise). The results of the logit model show that the oldest people 
have a lower probability of receiving operating subsidies. In addition, French entrepreneurs 
are favored in receiving subsidies in comparison with foreigners (both European and non-
European).  The  likelihood  of  receiving  operating  subsidies  does  not  depend  on  the 
entrepreneur's  gender.  People  who  were  employed  before  starting  their  business  have  the 
lowest probability of receiving public support. Moreover, formerly inactive persons are less 
likely to get this support than short-term and long-term unemployed persons are. These results 
are not surprising if we consider the French regulation concerning public support of start-up 
firms (presented in section 3 above). Entrepreneurs who had already started another firm prior 
to 1998 are less likely to be granted public support than are those who are starting their first 
business. Moreover, high initial amounts of capital and financing from personal resources or 
bank loans are significantly and positively correlated with operating subsidies. The location of 
a  firm  outside  Paris  and  the  surrounding  region  increases  the  probability  of  obtaining 
operating  subsidies.  Compared  with  the  building  industry,  entrepreneurs  in  the  trade, 
transportation and services sectors are less likely to receive subsidies.  
 
 
6.1 The effect of operating subsidies on firm survival 
 
Table 4 reports the matching estimates (average treatment on the treated, ATT) of the 
effect of operating subsidies on firm survival at different periods of time (one-year, two-year, 
four-year, six-year and eight-year periods). The variable of interest is the survival rate. The 
first column presents the period; the second and third columns give the survival rates of the 
treated  and  the  control  groups;  the  fourth  column  gives  the  ATT  estimates  (difference 
between the two preceding columns); and the fifth column presents standard errors. Table A2 
in the Appendix shows the results of the balancing test for the first model. It confirms the 
validity of the matching method, which reduces the bias by approximately 90% for almost all 
of the variables. The balancing test measures the ‘similarity’ of observations remaining after 
the  matching  process.  Columns  (2)  and  (3)  indicate  the  means  of  each  variable  prior  to  
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matching for the treated and untreated groups, respectively, and column (4) gives the mean 
for the untreated group after matching. Column (5) indicates the bias reduction.  
We find that operating subsidized firms are more likely to survive than other firms at 
each duration, except for the one-year and two-year periods. Such a difference between the 
short-term and long-term effects of public support on firm survival has already been found in 
research aiming at evaluating the efficiency of these policies (see above in Section 2 our 
comments on Pfeiffer and Reise, 2000). For France, in 1998, we must consider that the main 
public support given was not a lump sum (which can cause the “cash and carry effect”) but 
operating  subsidies  that  are  granted  for  one  year.  In  particular,  this  is  the  case  for  new 
entrepreneurs who are entitled to social income and who continue to receive it for one year. 
After running their business for a year, if their business income is lower than their social 
income, it is in their interest to give up their business to remain entitled to receive their social 
income.   
The case of unemployed people is more complex because their unemployment benefits 
are no longer paid when they start their business. However, they have no social contribution 
to pay, an advantage that they lose after one year. In addition, if they give up their business, 
they  are  again  entitled  to  unemployment  benefits  because  their  right  to  these  benefits  is 
‘deferred but not suppressed’ when they start their business. Here, again, if their income from 
their business is low, it is in the unemployed person’s interest to close the business. It is 
noteworthy that the right to deferred unemployment benefits, which is an incentive to start a 
new business, is also an incentive to give it up if the entrepreneur’s short-term expectations 
are not fulfilled.   
However, it is remarkable that in the long run (until eight years after the start-up’s 
creation) the impact of operating subsidies on firm survival is still positive. This impact can 
be explained by the very small sizes of the start-up firms that are included in our sample
5. 
More than 25% of start-up firms have capital of less than 4000 Euros. Operating subsidies 
amount to more than this if the entrepreneur is entitled to a minimum social income. For 
micro-firms, operating subsidies may be a supplement to a very small initial capital and a 
substitute for credit rationing.  
 
 
Table 4 - ATT Estimates of Firm Survival Rate for Different Periods  
 
Periods Treated Controls  Difference S.E.
1998-1999 .909 .890 .0190 .0113
1998-2000 .800 .779 .0212 .0159
1998-2002 .650 .615 .0348*** .0186
1998-2004 .583 .538 .0446*** .0191
1998-2006 .509 .462 .0468*** .0192
Number of Observations 10 452 3 653 6 799  
Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998  
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
 
5 This is a characteristic of start-up firms in all developed countries. However, in most countries micro-
firms are not taken into account by administrative sources or firm surveys.   
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Table 5 presents the estimations using the PSM kernel method of the impact of operating 
subsidies on different subsamples of firms (with bank loans, without bank loans, receiving 
subsidies other than the ACCRE, receiving the ACCRE only) over the 1998-2006 period.  
Like Crépon and Duguet (2003) with French data, we find that firms with bank loans have the 
highest  probability  of  survival,  be  they  subsidized  or  not.  This  result  is  not  surprising 
considering  Blanchflower  and  Oswald’s  (1998)  statement  about  “secured  loans  (i.e.,  with 
collateral) that are a rational response by bankers to imperfect knowledge about the different 
projects”. That is, bankers finance the projects with the best chance of success and, as a 
consequence, select projects with specific characteristics. Unsurprisingly, we also find that 
operating subsidies coupled with bank loans allow firms to survive longer. If we decompose 
operating  subsidies  into  the  ACCRE  and  other  subsidies  (granted  by  local  or  regional 
authorities), we find that both kinds of public support have a positive impact on firm survival. 
It is also noteworthy that the group that only receives the ACCRE (without bank loans) has a 
relatively  low  probability  of  surviving  after  eight  years,  but  the  ACCRE  has  the  highest 
impact on firm survival.  
 
Table 5 – ATT Estimates of Firm Survival Rate for Different Subgroups (1998-2006) 
Sample Treated Controls  Difference S.E.
Firms with bank loans .5724       .5172 .0551*** .0270
Number of observations 3 466 1 656 1 810
Firms with no bank 
loans
.4552 .3930    .0622*** .0191
Number of observations 6 986 1 997 4 989
Firms receiving 
subsidies other than the 
ACCRE
.5311 .4889 .0421*** .016
Number of observations 8 102 1 303 6 799
Firms receiving the 
ACCRE only
.4814 .4048 .0766 ***   .0217
Number of observations 8 317 1 518 6 799  
Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998  
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, respectively. 
 
 
6.2 The effect of operating subsidies on firm performance 
 
Even if subsidized firms survive longer, we do not know the nature of the effect of 
these  subsidies  on  efficiency  and  profitability.  Indeed,  operating  subsidies  can  lead  less 
productive firms to remain in the market. Table 6 presents PSM estimations on firm turnover 
over the eight-year period. A significant effect is found on the turnover level, specifically its 
absolute variation but not its growth rate during this period. Employment growth is the second 
indicator with significant results (not reported here). Operating subsidies allow firms to hire 
more wage earners. However, this result must be interpreted cautiously because there are two 
different components of this evolution. First, some self-employed persons may become wage 
earners as the firm grows, and second, new jobs may be created. Moreover, no significant 
effect was found on other performance criteria (apparent labor productivity, apparent capital 
productivity, profitability and value-added growth) in terms of either absolute variations or 
growth rates. To sum up our results, operating subsidies for the first year of a firm’s operation 
enable more firms to survive after a period of eight years and to hire more wage earners.  
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However, if we consider different efficiency and profitability indicators, firms that receive 
public  support  do  not  perform  differently  than  others.  They  do  not  lag  behind  the 
unsubsidized firms because in the long run, most firms that are less efficient than average 
have been eliminated from the market, be they subsidized or not.  
 
Table 6 – ATT Estimates of Firm Turnover 
 
Variable Treated Controls  Difference S.E.
Turnover 526.155 324.481 201.673*** 97.157
Turnover Absolute 
Variation
405.959 227.180 178.779*** 83.64
Turnover Growth Rate 13.021 5.404 7.617 6.604
Number of Observations 4,732 1,854 3,009
 
Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998  
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, respectively. 
 
6.3 Tests of robustness 
 
Table 7 represents the operating subsidy effects estimated by three alternative PSM 
models: (i) We use a nearest-neighbor method without replacement; that is, we use one and 
only one firm from the control group to correspond to a treated one. (ii)  In the Nearest-
Neighbor method, we diminish the caliper from 10
−4
 to 10
−3. This modifies the size of the 
common support of both distributions. Even if this support is larger than in the previous 
situation, the significantly positive effect of start-up subsidies remains. (iii) We use a kernel 
matching  method  that  uses  weighted  averages  of  all  individuals  in  the  control  group  to 
construct  the  counterfactual  outcome.  All  alternative  models  confirm  the  results  of  our 
preferred model that operating subsidies allow more firms to survive.  
We also run a biprobit model of simultaneous equations explaining the receipt of start-
up subsidies in the first equation and estimating survival in the second one. We use bank loans 
as an instrument as they are highly correlated with the receipt of subsidies. The first equation 
presents results similar to those of the logit of the PSM first step. The second probit shows 
that start-up subsidies have a significantly positive impact on survival: subsidized firms are 
more likely to survive than others. At the same time, the greater the initial amount of capital, 
the higher the firm’s probability of survival. Residuals in the model of start-up subsidies are 
negatively correlated with the residuals in the model of firm survival. Thus, subsidies are 
allocated to entrepreneurs to start up firms that, all other factors being equal, are less likely to 




Table 7 - Tests of Robustness of the Estimates of Firm Survival Rate  
 
Periods Treated Controls  Difference S.E.
PSM Nearest Neighbor 
With  0.0001 Caliper No 
Replacement
.505   .464 .041*** .0181
PSM Nearest Neighbor 
With  0.001 Caliper 
With Replacement
.503 .459 .043*** .0191
PSM Kernel Method .506 .448 .059*** .016 
Number of Observations 10,452
 
Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998  
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, respectively. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
 
In this paper, we create an original and rich statistical dataset by matching two data 
sources including the characteristics of entrepreneurs who created firms in 1998 in France and 
economic  and  financial  variables  related  to  these  firms  over  the  1998-2006  period.  We 
evaluate the effect of operating public subsidies on firm survival and on firm performance. As 
the  distribution  of  entrepreneurs  who  get  start-up  subsidies  is  not  random,  we  face  a 
selectivity process depending on entrepreneurs’ characteristics. To control for this selection 
bias, we use propensity score matching (PSM) models. 
Our results first show that firms that received operating subsidies for one year are 
more  likely  to  survive  after  their  first  two  years  of  life.  Second,  bank  loans  increase  the 
probability of firm survival, be they subsidized or not. Third, operating subsidies allow firms 
to  increase  their  turnover  and  their  employment  of  wage  earners.  However,  we  find  no 
significant effect on the profitability and the efficiency of their factors of production.  
Finally,  the  long-term  effect  of  the  operating  subsidies  is  significant.  Higher  firm 
survival  and  turnover  and  job  creation  are  obtained  at  a  rather  limited  cost  to  the  public 
administration.  Indeed,  these  subsidies  are  partly  counterbalanced  by  the  unemployment 
benefits that are saved when unemployed people start a business. In addition, these subsidies 
prove  to  be  effective  for  the  social  groups  that  are  particularly  targeted  by  the  ACCRE 
program. 
Some  weaknesses  remain  to  be  corrected  in  the  future.  First,  to  take  into  account 
economic and financial variables each year and increase the amount of information we use for 
our  econometric  estimation,  we  have  to  implement  discrete  duration  models.  Second,  the 
ACCRE changed at the beginning of the 2000s. With subsequent waves of the SINE survey 
(2002 and 2006), we will be able to test the effect of the ACCRE reforms on firm survival. 
Moreover, in these new surveys we know the exact date of firm failure, which will enable us 
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Table A1 - Estimations of the Logit Model 
 
Variable Estimation Variable Estimation
Nationality Initial Amount of Capital (Euros)
Not French        Ref. Less than 2,000 Ref
French .281***    2,000 to 4,000 .434***    
Age 4,000 to 8,000 .451***   
Less than 25 Ref.  8,000 to 16,000 .433***   
25 to 50 NS 16,000 to 40,000 .451***   
More than 50 -.476***    40,000 to 80,000 .497***   
Education More than 80,000 .364**    
No Diploma Ref. Financing Sources
Professional Certificate .372***        Other Types of Sources   Ref. 
A-Levels .266***        Bank Loans .887***
Higher National Diploma .432***        Personal Resources         .816***
Master Degree or More .334***        Sector
Professional Skilled Construction Ref. 
Craftsman Ref.  Commerce  -.367***
Student -.249*          Transport -.530***   
Unskilled Workers -.293**         Real-Estate Activity -.870***   
Other Skilled Workers NS Counseling  -.433***   
Previous Activity Status Functional Services -.436***   
Employed Ref.  Hostels and Restaurants -.298**     
Unemployed Less Than One Year 1.911***    Education -.623***   
Unemployed More Than One Year 2.028***    Health and Social Activity -.958***   
Inactive .333***    Other Sectors  NS
Have you  Received Preliminary 
Training
Region  
Yes, after request Ref.  Outside Paris Ref.
Has Not Received Any -.504***    Paris and its Suburbs -.743***
How many firms have you ever 
created?
Franchise
Has Never Created Ref.  Yes Ref.
Has Created One Firm -.171**      No -.177*     
Has created More than One Firm NS Subsidiary  (Yes No) -.388***   
How many hours of start-up counsel 
have you
Intercept -2.251***   
Less than One Hour Ref. 
One Hour to 5 Hours NS
5 Hour to 3 Days .508***
More than 3 Days NS
Who Set Up The Project?
Entrepreneur With Someone Ref. 
Entrepreneur Alone -.473***   
Prospecting for Customers
Yes Ref.
No .291***   
Number of observations    10.452
Pseudo R2        .269
Log Likelihood   -4940.309  
Sources: FICUS 1998-2006 and SINE 1998  
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, respectively.  
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Table A2 - Balancing Test 






over 50 years-old                           .073 .123 .072 96.8
French                             .894 .864 .892 98.2
Student  .046        .054 .034 75.1
Inactive                      .054 .067 .047 40.8
Previous Activity
Unemployed Less than a Year  .282 .125 .269 92.7
Unemployed More than a Year  .200 .099 .210 84.2
Inactive .091 .150 .082 93.9
Education
Professional Certificate                                 .464 .351 .474 92.3
A-Levels                                                  .149 .168 .137     -349.4
Higher National Diploma 0.126 0.145 0.148 -403.7
Master Degree or More 0.118 0.165 0.098 68.1
Have Receive no Preliminary
Training
0.506 0.664 0.511 92.1
Initial Amount of Capital (Euros)
1,524 to 3,811                             0.136 0.113 0.141 43.4
3,811 to 7,622  0.129 0.099 0.117 77.5
7,622 to 15,244  0.318 0.336 0.319 93.2
15,244 to 38,112  0.163 0.136 0.166 52.0
38,112 to 76,244  0.068 0.066 0.067 -142.5
More than 76,244                          0.05 0.062 0.048 96.9
Have Created One firm before                 0.122 0.152 0.116 94.5
Counsel between 5h and 3h                  0.112 0.081 0.11 83.7
Sector Of Activity
Commerce  0.082 0.099 0.082 100.0
Transport 0.053 0.059 0.058 96.7
Real-Estate Activity 0.029 0.061 0.029 92.6
Counseling  0.106 0.138 0.112 74.0
Functional Services 0.049 0.053 0.043 57.3
Hostels and Restaurants 0.043 0.045 0.037 -474.6
Education 0.013 0.017 0.012 16.3
Health and Social Activity 0.027 0.068 0.024 99.0
Financing Personal Resources 0.723 0.646 0.715 93.8
Financing Bank Loans                       0.371 0.266 0.38 94.6
Paris and its Suburbs                                0.068 0.127 0.066 94.3
Project Set up Alone                      0.433 0.516 0.409 93.1
Customer Prospecting  0.524 0.421 0.516 92.4
Franchise                                    0.078 0.083 0.088 84.6
Subsidiary        0.249 0.31 0.254 98.0  
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